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INTRODUCTION
In 1990, during the first Bush administration, Congress enacted
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 1 The ADA aims to combat
the vastly unaddressed, yet pervasive and prevalent, problem of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities in America.2 The ADA
targets discrimination in a broad range of areas, including housing,
public transportation, recreation, and employment.3 In the realm of
employment, the ADA affords persons within its reach legal protec-
tion against discrimination by a covered entity4 with regard to job ap-
plication procedures, hiring, advancement, discharge, compensation,
and the like. 5
When Congress enacted the ADA, many heralded the statute as a
breakthrough for individuals with disabilities, 6 an aspiration that has
become only a partial reality. While the ADA has succeeded in imple-
menting change for many disabled individuals, particularly those indi-
viduals suffering from obvious physical limitations that can be easily
accommodated in the workplace, 7 it has been less successful in assist-
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2 Id. § 12101.
3 Id. § 12101 (a) (3).
4 Id. § 12111(2). The ADA defines a "covered entity" as "an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." Id.
5 Id. § 12112(a). An individual who attempts to sustain a discrimination claim
against the employer is required to show, in addition to disability status and qualified indi-
vidual status, that her employer subjected her to discrimination as a result of her disability.
Id.; Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999); Poindexter v. Atchi-
son, 168 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999). See infra Part L.A (explaining disability and
qualified individual status).
6 See William C. Smith, Drawing Boundaries, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2002, at 49, 53 (quoting
the first President Bush, upon signing the ADA into law, as saying that the ADA signaled a
new time where "every man, woman, and child with a disability can [ I pass through once
closed doors into a bright new era of equality, independence and freedom.") (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Laura Lee Hall, Making the ADA Work for People with
Psychiatric Disabilities, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAw 241, 241 (Rich-
ard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds., 1997) [hereinafter MENTAL DISORDER] ("Disability
rights advocates celebrated its passage, hailing it as the most sweeping mandate ever in-
voked against discrimination directed at people with disabilities.").
7 As an example, a wheelchair bound individual, for whom a wheelchair ramp would
clearly be a reasonable accommodation, would easily fall under the protection of the Act,
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ing individuals who suffer from more complicated illnesses that do
not fit comfortably within the Act's narrow boundaries.8
This failure is nowhere more cogent, and hence, nowhere more
difficult, than with respect to individuals with mental illness who at-
tempt to gain shelter from discrimination under the ADA. Despite
the fact that mentally ill individuals are explicitly listed among those
who could potentially gain coverage under the Act,9 the drafters
clearly created the ADA without giving much thought to its impact on
the mentally ill population.10
There is considerable debate as to how to remedy the injustice
done by the Act. Some advocates support a broader reading of the
ADA's requirements or an amendment to the statute as viable reme-
dies to correct the current exclusion of the mentally ill under the
ADA.11 In light of the numerous problems arising under the ADA
when dealing with claims from mentally ill plaintiffs, however, it may
be more effective to start anew.
The problem mentally ill plaintiffs face under the ADA is twofold.
First, mentally ill individuals have always faced considerable diffi-
and therefore be entitled to the reasonable accommodation from her employer. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), (9)(A).
8 See Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disa-
bility Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 107, 109 (1997) ("[W]hat
was once touted as the most comprehensive civil rights legislation passed by Congress since
the 1964 Civil Rights Act[ ] has become increasingly narrowed to the point where it is in
danger of becoming ineffective.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
9 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A) (defining disability with respect to an individual to en-
compass a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the indi-
vidual's major life activities).
10 See Randal I. Goldstein, Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v. United
Air Lines, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 942 n.123 (2001). The author explains that a survey of
the legislative history reveals that Congress and the experts involved in the congressional
debates preceding the ADA's enactment primarily considered the plight of physically im-
paired individuals. The author further states that the effect of Congress's lack of consider-
ation of mentally ill individuals is obvious in the Act itself, as § 12102(2) (A), which
enumerates suggestions for possible reasonable accommodations, excludes any reference
to an accommodation specifically tailored to the needs of a mentally disabled individual.
Id.
I I See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability Dis-
crimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42
VILL. L. REV. 409, 572-84 (1997) (discussing alternative remedies, such as the inclusion of
temporary disabilities, or the recognition of an individual's ability to pursue both disability
benefits and nondiscrimination rights); Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psy-
chiatric Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L.
REv. 271, 318-19 (2000) (proposing an amendment to "discard the 'substantial limitation
in major life activity' prong in . . . employment discrimination cases"); Goldstein, supra
note 10, at 972-73 (also urging removal of "major life activity" prong). The above authors
suggest that a shift in statutory language or litigation strategy would suffice to correct the
mistakes of the ADA. See, e.g., id. at 972-73. However, this Note suggests that the problems
mentally ill individuals face under the ADA are a reflection of a larger societal ambivalence
toward the mentally ill, and as such, argues that action more drastic than a statutory
amendment for the mentally ill is necessary to truly achieve parity.
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culty12 meeting the competing requirements of the ADA-disability
status and qualified individual with a disability status13 -but after the
Supreme Court further specified the requirements needed to estab-
lish disability in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,14
the challenge is practically insurmountable. 15 Proving that one is af-
fected by her illness seriously enough to be considered disabled under
the ADA definition, but not so disabled that she is unqualified for the
position, impels the plaintiff to "burn the candle at both ends." Essen-
tially, mentally ill individuals defeat their own claims by asserting that
they are sufficiently qualified for their position, but nonetheless simul-
taneously suffer from a condition pervasive enough to be considered a
statutorily acceptable disability. Consequently, most, if not all, of the
ADA claims brought by mentally ill plaintiffs who attempt to gain pro-
tection have failed in the past, and will likely continue to do so in the
future. 16
Second, mentally ill plaintiffs face a clear proof problem under
the ADA. Because physicians almost always diagnose mental illness
12 See infra Part III; see, e.g., Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 509 (7th
Cir. 2001) (panic attacks); Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 255 (1st Cir. 2001)
(bipolar disorder); Tyler v. Ispat Inland Inc., 245 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2001) (depression);
Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2001) (depression and obsessive
compulsive disorder (OCD)); Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1085
(9th Cir. 2001) (post-traumatic stress disorder and depression); Smoke v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. 98-1370, 2000 WL 192806 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2000) (severe depression); Krocka v.
City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200
F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 2000) (depression); Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d
723, 725 (8th Cir. 1999) (depression); Shiplett v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 97-2056,
1999 WL 435169 (6th Cir. June 17, 1999) (anxiety and panic attacks); Evans v. Magna
Group, No. 98-3125, 1999 WL 402401 (7th Cir. June 11, 1999) (OCD).
13 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8); infta Part IV.
14 534 U.S. 184 (2002). In Toyota, the Court held that in identifying a major life
activity that has been affected by the alleged disability-one of the three requirements
necessary to achieve disability status-the plaintiff must identify an activity that is of "cen-
tral importance to daily life." Id. at 197. See also infra Part II.C, D (discussing Toyota and its
likely impact on mentally ill plaintiffs).
15 See discussion infra Part IV; see, e.g., Hill v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, No. 02-5305,
2002 WL 31863829 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2002) (bipolar disorder and chronic fatigue syn-
drome); Ogborn v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local No. 881, 305 F.3d
763, 766-67 (7th Cir. 2002) (major depression); Cartwright v. Lockheed Martin Util.
Servs., Inc., No. 00-6671, 2002 WL 1461753 (6th Cir. Jul. 3, 2002) (depression); Carroll v.
Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 235, 238 (1st Cir. 2002) (extreme stress); Spangler v. Fed.
Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 848-50 (8th Cir. 2002) (depression and
phobia); Boerst v. Gen. Mills Operations, Inc., No. 00-3281, 2002 WL 59637 (6th Cir. Jan.
15, 2002) (anxiety disorder); Hawana v. City of New York, 230 F. Supp. 2d 518, 521, 531
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (severe depression and panic disorder); Grillasca-Pietri v. Portorican Am.
Broad. Co., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260-62 (D.P.R. 2002) (identifiable stress disorder);
Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-10546-GAO, 2002 WL 31432688 (D.Mass. Oct.
30, 2002) (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)); Pouliot v. Town of Fairfield,
226 F. Supp. 2d 233, 238, 241-42 (D. Me. 2002) (bipolar disorder).
16 See supra notes 12, 15 and accompanying text.
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based on symptoms' 7 to which only the individual who experiences
them can really attest, mentally ill plaintiffs will necessarily base all
three of the requirements needed to obtain disability status'8 upon
self-reporting. The fact that mental illness is "hidden" from others in
this fashion makes it difficult for these plaintiffs to establish adequate
proof of the existence of a disability under the ADA.1 9 Courts often
find contradictory statements in a plaintiff's self-reporting, as the indi-
vidual tries simultaneously to fit herself into the both the "qualified"
and "disabled" constructions under the ADA, and as a result, find her
claims lacking in credibility. 20 Additionally, as mental illness is a
deviation from "normal" mental and emotional functioning,21 there
exists a larger societal distrust of invisible impairments and an unwill-
ingness to treat such impairments as true disabilities. 22
This Note examines the ways in which the ADA disserves mentally
ill plaintiffs who are equally vulnerable, and thus equally deserving of
protection from discrimination, as physically impaired individuals.
Part I examines the legislative purpose of the Act as well as the text of
the ADA itself, focusing most closely on the definition of disability as
set forth in the statute, as this definition is often the largest hurdle for
mentally ill plaintiffs. Because the Supreme Court has not yet decided
an ADA case involving a mentally ill plaintiff in the employment con-
text, Part II examines the significant Supreme Court case law that has
refined and fleshed out the ADA's definition of disability with respect
to non-mentally ill plaintiffs. This Part emphasizes the definition of
disability launched in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Wil-
liams,23 the most recent Supreme Court case to address the disability
definition. The examination of the Supreme Court's decisions con-
ducted in Part II reveals the Court's restrictive and narrow reading of
the disability definition, and explores the impact such a narrow inter-
pretation of disability will likely have on mentally ill plaintiffs attempt-
ing to gain the protection of the ADA. In light of the potentially
problematic issues the disability definition raises for plaintiffs, Part III
17 See Stephanie Proctor Miller, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimina-
tion on the Basis of Psychiatric Disability, 85 CAL. L. REv. 701, 725 (1997) ("Psychiatric disabili-
ties are diagnosed not on the basis of physiological tests or symptoms, but on the basis of
behavior.").
18 See infra Parts I.A.1, II.
19 See infra Part LV.A.2.
20 See id.
21 See Kathleen D. Zylan, Comment, Legislation That Drives Us Crazy: An Overview of
"Mental Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 79, 85 (2000)
("The basic problem inherent in defining a mental disorder is that the primary criteria for
determining whether a mental disorder exists requires a judgment about the degree to
which a behavior deviates from the norm.").
22 See infta Part V.
23 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
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examines the purpose of the disability requirement, as well as the ways
in which the unique nature of mental illness is ill-suited to fit within
the confines of disability status under the ADA. Part IV examines the
distinctive nature of the mentally ill plaintiff in the courtroom, and
explores the difficulties these individuals face in meeting the dual re-
quirements of disability as well as qualified individual status on both a
conceptual and practical level. Part V considers the larger societal
view of mental illness that is reflected in mentally ill plaintiffs' out-
comes in suits under the ADA. This Part identifies the societal ambiv-
alence that leads to negative results for mentally ill plaintiffs and looks
to sources outside the ADA, both in litigation strategy and beyond, to
aid in incorporating mentally ill individuals with disabilities into the
mainstream of society and into America's workforce.
I
BACKGROUND AND STATED PURPOSE OF THE ADA
Throughout history, society has discriminated against individuals
with disabilities, largely by marginalizing their place in society as well
as by segregating them as a group from the mainstream. 24 At the time
of the ADA's enactment, forty-three million Americans suffered from
a physical or mental illness, and the numbers were steadily increas-
ing.25 The ADA functioned as a national mandate "to end discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with
disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American
life." 26 Congress enacted the ADA in recognition of the fact that indi-
viduals who suffered from discrimination based on disability, as op-
posed to discrimination based on other factors, had often been left, at
that time, without legal recourse to redress their suffering.27 There-
24 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989).
25 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1).
26 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2.
27 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (4). The Act was largely meant to provide relief against dis-
crimination similar to that provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for victims
of discrimination based on race and gender. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989) ("The
ADA incorporates by reference the enforcement provisions under [T]itle VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (including injunctive relief and back pay)."). The comparison, in some
ways, is quite apt: society has also traditionally marginalized victims of discrimination based
on race and gender. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (declaring that all citizens enjoy civil rights equal
to white citizens). However, in dealing with race and gender discrimination, the perceived
shortcomings or limitations of those marginalized groups were illusory, whereas in dealing
with discrimination based on disability, the limitations are a reality that must be faced. The
central pertinent difference remains that, in time, a gender or race anti-discrimination
statute could succeed in wiping out all discrimination against those historically persecuted
individuals. With respect to disability laws, however, the statutes and remedies will necessa-
rily be omnipresent, as the inherent limitations individuals with disabilities must face will
always require accommodation. Therefore, because the types of discrimination differ in
several distinct ways, modeling the Act after race and gender anti-discrimination statutes
leaves some crucial issues for disabled individuals unaddressed. For a thoughtful discus-
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fore, Congress created the ADA in order to "provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities,"28 as well as to provide "clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities." 29 The ADA also complements
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination in cer-
tain private and public sectors receiving federal funds.3 0
The ADA aims to "level the playing field" for individuals with disa-
bilities.31 It is intended to raise disabled individuals to the level of
competitive market standards by affording them accommodations,
provided that these accommodations are not overly burdensome or
costly,32 rather than to alter or lower the marketplace standards to
integrate those individuals who have inherent limitations. 33 What this
means for individuals with disabilities is that they must satisfy an em-
ployer's work related standards in order to gain the ADA's protec-
tion.34 Essentially, the law intends to protect only those individuals
who are able to compete for employment.35
sion of these concerns, see Norman Daniels, Mental Disabilities, Equal Opportunity, and the
ADA, in MENTAL DISORDER, supra note 6, at 281, 282-83.
28 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (1).
29 Id. § 12101 (b) (2).
30 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794; Locke, supra note 8, at 107.
31 See Siefken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Con-
gress enacted the ADA to 'level the playing field' for disabled people. Congress perceived
that employers were basing employment decisions on unfounded stereotypes.").
32 The statute obligates an employer to make a reasonable accommodation to an indi-
vidual who qualifies for protection under the ADA. However, the statute excuses the em-
ployer from providing an accommodation that causes "undue hardship," or an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). In determining
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer, the statute
contemplates the following factors: (1) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed;
(2) the overall financial resources of the facility, the number of persons employed at the
facility, the effect on expenses or resources, and any other effect of the accommodation on
the operation of the facility; (3) the overall financial resources of the covered entity, and
(4) the type of operations of the covered entity. Id. § 12111(10)(B).
33 The ADA states that in determining whether an individual is qualified to perform
the position, and therefore, whether the individual is granted statutory coverage under the
ADA, "consideration shall he given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a
job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising
or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
essential functions of the job." Id. § 12111(8).
34 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26 (1989). The Senate Report for the ADA reads:
By including the phrase "qualified individual with a disability," the Commit-
tee intends to reaffirm that this legislation does not undermine an em-
ployer's ability to choose and maintain qualified workers. This legislation
simply provides that employment decisions must not have the purpose of
[sic] effect of subjecting a qualified individual with a disability to discrimi-
nation on the basis of his or her disability.
Id.
35 Christopher G. Bell, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Mental Disability, and Work, in
MENTAL DISORDER, supra note 6, at 203, 204-05.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Despite the difficulties debilitated individuals face in meeting an
employer's work standards for non-disabled individuals, for better or
worse, Congress intended the ADA to act as an equal opportunity stat-
ute, not an affirmative action statute. Therefore, the statute does not
protect disabled individuals who cannot identify a reasonable accom-
modation that would enable them to satisfy work-related standards, or
who can identify such an accommodation, but only at an excessive
cost to the employer. Further, if an individual is unable to "do the
job" in whatever way the employer sees fit 36 as a result of the disability,
the employer is free to take an adverse action against the employee,
notwithstanding the disability.37 In this way, the purpose of the ADA
is narrower and more targeted than it may seem at first blush.
Many proponents of the ADA were well-educated, successful, and
proactive individuals.38 The disabilities that they shouldered were, by
and large, physical in nature.39 These individuals had, with the aid of
wheelchairs, prosthetic limbs, hearing aids, and guide dogs, overcome
adversity and managed to transcend the hurdles they had faced. In
turn, they wished to create a statute that would afford similarly situ-
ated individuals the same opportunities. 40 The drafters did not con-
template the unique plight of those with less easily conquerable
disabilities, such as mental disabilities. Thus, individuals who are una-
ble to easily succeed in competitive employment environments find
the statute much less valuable than they had initially hoped.41
A. The Pertinent Language of the ADA
In terms of draftsmanship, the ADA is hardly a model for clarity.
Despite an unequivocal congressional mandate set forth in the ADA
36 See supra notes 33, 34.
37 Sprenger v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 253 F.3d 1106, 1114 (8th Cir. 2001) ("An em-
ployer need not retain an employee who cannot perform the essential functions of his
job."); Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 649-50 (1st Cir. 2000)
We stress that the Act does not require employers to retain disabled em-
ployees who cannot perform the essential functions of their jobs without
reasonable accommodation. ... If... allowing the sick employee to retain
his or her job places the employer in a hardship situation where it cannot
secure in some reasonable alternative way the services for which it hired the
ailing employee, and yet is blocked from effecting a rehire, the ADA does
not require the retention of the disabled person.
); Cousins v. Howell Corp., 113 F. Supp. 2d 262, 270-71 (D. Conn. 2000) ("The ADA does
not require employers to retain disabled employees who cannot perform the essential
functions of their jobs with or without reasonable accommodation."); Mutchie v. TVX Min-
eral Hill, Inc., No. CV 96-81-BLG-RWA, 1998 WL 1157404, at *2 (D. Mont. Nov. 16, 1998)
("The ADA simply does not protect an individual who cannot perform the essential func-
tions of his position, with or without accommodation by the employer.").
38 Bell, supra note 35, at 204.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 205.
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which calls for clear and enforceable standards, 42 the actual text of
the statute is broad and often ambiguous, with many central terms, yet
very few definitions of or interpretive guidelines for those terms.43 As
a result, the courts must determine for themselves, relying on the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines44
and their own intuition, what limitations Congress intended when
drafting the statute. 4 5
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual
with a disability .. .46 Therefore, an individual who seeks protection
under the ADA must necessarily conquer two hurdles before claiming
entitlement: first, the individual must meet the definition of disability,
and second, the individual must be qualified to perform the functions
of the position.47 The Act defines a "qualified individual" as one who
is able to perform the "essential functions of the employment posi-
tion" that the individual holds or desires, with or without "reasonable
accommodation. '48 Exactly what constitutes a "reasonable accommo-
dation" has been the subject of much litigation. 49 However, the ADA
42 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
43 See Smith, supra note 6, at 49. Smith notes:
In a March 14[, 2002] speech at the Georgetown University Law Center,
[Supreme CourtJustice Sandra Day] O'Connor cited the ADA as "an exam-
ple of what happens when the sponsors are so eager to get something
passed that what passes hasn't been as carefully written as a group of law
professors might put together. So it leaves lots of ambiguities and gaps and
things for courts to figure out."
44 Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1-16. The EEOC composed guidelines in accor-
dance with a Congressional grant, expressed in 42 U.S.C. § 12116. These guidelines, while
providing focus and consistency to court decisions, are by no means binding; courts can,
and do, freely depart from the EEOC regulations. See, e.g., Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d
1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that, notwithstanding the inclusion of concentration
as a major life activity in the EEOC guidelines, "[c]oncentration may be a significant and
necessary component of a major life activity, . . . but it is not an 'activity' itself").
45 See, e.g., Law v. City of Scottsville, No. 98-6335, 2000 IL 799742, at *5 (6th Cir. June
15, 2000) (relying, inter alia, on the EEOC's interpretive guidelines); Taylor v. Phoenix-
ville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Arnold v. UPS, Inc., 136 F.3d
854, 863-66 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing legislative history and congressional reports as interpre-
tive aids); Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co., 155 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Aka v.
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145
F.3d 437, 442 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136
F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing EEOC interpretive guidelines).
46 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
47 See id.
48 Id. § 12111(8).
49 See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403-05 (2002) (holding that a
disabled individual's requested accommodation that would disrupt an employer's seniority
system is ordinarily not reasonable); Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F.3d 160, 169-71 (3d
Cir. 2002) (finding that placing an employee in a less stressful position once a vacancy
arises is a reasonable accommodation); Palotai v. Univ. of Md. at Coll. Park, No. 00-1147,
2002 WL 1379969, at *8 (4th Cir. June 27, 2002) (declaring that elimination of elements of
a job that arise from the position's duties is not a reasonable accommodation); Mays v.
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itself enumerates a list of accommodations that employers should con-
sider to be reasonable. 50
The heart of the difficulty for mentally ill individuals lies within
the disability inquiry, and consequently, this is an area in which litiga-
tion abounds. 51 Under the ADA, an individual is not automatically
guaranteed protection against discrimination merely by virtue of the
fact that she suffers from a physical or mental disorder. 52 Rather, she
must meet the statutory definition of disability. The ADA defines disa-
bility as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual. '53 Alternatively,
an individual may attain disability status by showing that she has either
a record of such an impairment 54 or is regarded as having such an
impairment.55 This definition is the same as the one used in the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973.56 In order to understand the full scope of
Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that requiring an employer to create
newjobs tailored to each employee's abilities is not a reasonable accommodation) (citing
Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523-24 (7th Cir. 2000)); Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296
F.3d 958, 963-64 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that allowing an employee to return to work
with modified job duties is a reasonable accommodation); Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 967 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that granting an employee's
requested leave for disability constitutes a reasonable accommodation).
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). While the list may be helpful as a starting point, it is
clearly not exhaustive. The EEOC has clarified the reasonable accommodation require-
ment somewhat. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL FOR THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 111-1-37 (1992); EEOC Enforcement Gui-
dance: Psychiatric Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act, in 3 EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL (BNA) No. 224, at N:2331 (May 1997).
51 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999); Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998);
Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs, Inc., 311 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 2002); Ageman v. AFG Indus.,
Inc., No. 01-57034, 2002 WL 31554051 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2002). See also Smith, supra note
6, at 50 (quoting Arlene Mayerson, a lawyer with the Disability Rights Education Fund, as
stating that "[t] he courts' receptiveness to [employers'] arguments on disability was wholly
unanticipated and staggering," and estimating that fewer than five percent of ADA litiga-
tion survives the summary judgment stage) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
52 Some states have created a more generous approach in their antidiscrimination
laws by allowing coverage for any individual with a medically diagnosable disorder. See, e.g.,
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 2003) (defining disability as "a physical, mental or
medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological con-
ditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by
medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques .....
53 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
54 Id. § 12102(2)(B).
55 Id. § 12102(2)(C).
56 See 29 U.S.C. § 705 (20) (B); see also Michelle T. Friedland, Not Disabled Enough: The
ADA's "Major Life Activity" Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REv. 171, 183-84 (1999). An
alternate version of the ADA would have prohibited discrimination on the basis of handi-
cap, defined as a physical or mental impairment, perceived impairment, or record of im-
pairment. Id. at 184. Congress ultimately rejected this definition in favor of the
Rehabilitation Act definition, in large part because the latter had already been in use for
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the difficulties under the ADA, one must look closely at this statutory
definition of disability.
1. The Direct Route: Actual Disability
a. Impairment
The text of the ADA does not more specifically define "impair-
ment," but the EEOC has promulgated guidelines to assist with imple-
mentation of the Act. 57 These guidelines further define impairment
as "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and spe-
cific learning disabilities."5 3 In 1997, the EEOC suggested that
impairment also encompass mental and emotional illnesses listed in
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM-1V),59 which includes common mental
illnesses, such as major depressive disorders, bipolar disorders, anxiety
disorders, and schizophrenia.60
However, meeting the burden of establishing impairment is only
the first step in achieving disability status; medical diagnosis is not the
end of the inquiry. Instead, the ADA also requires an individual to
show that the impairment affects her life. 6 1 Consequently, the stat-
ute's definition of disability may not treat two individuals suffering
from the same affliction equally, as their fates turn in part on the mag-
nitude of the impact that the affliction has on each individual's life.6 2
fifteen years under the Rehabilitation Act, unlike the new and untested proposed defini-
tion. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It? 21 BERKELEVJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 127-28
(2000).
57 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 et seq. (2002). As noted above, the guidelines are not binding
upon the courts. See supra note 44.
58 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2).
59 AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
60 Id.; EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Psychiatric Disabilities and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 3 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (BNA) No. 224, at N:2331 (May 1997).
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
62 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. at 351-53 (2003). Compare Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 631 (1998) (holding that asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the ADA), with
Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Communications, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 401-02 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that although an individual with HIV suffers from a physical impairment, he is
not disabled under the ADA because he did not establish that he is substantially limited in
a major life activity); compare Ogborn v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
No. 881, 305 F.3d 763, 767-68 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff suffering from
depression was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA), with Mattice v. Mem'l Hosp.,
Inc., 249 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 2001) (declaring that plaintiff suffering from depression
qualified as disabled under the ADA); compare Nawrot v. CPC Int'l., 277 F.3d 896, 905 (7th
Cir. 2002) (declaring that plaintiff with diabetes was disabled under the ADA), with
Nordwall v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 01-1691, 2002 WL 31027956, at *3 (7th Cir. Sept. 6,
2002) (holding that plaintiff with diabetes was not disabled within the meaning of the
ADA); compare Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (de-
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b. Major Life Activity
Once an individual demonstrates that he suffers from a mental or
physical impairment, the ADA then requires the individual to identify
at least one major life activity that the impairment has affected as the
second step to establishing disability. 63 Just as the statute does not
further define "impairment," it similarly does not clarify what consti-
tutes a "major life activity." However, the EEOC has interpreted major
life activities to include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing. '6 4 Of course, there are major life activities that the EEOC does
not list, and, moreover, courts are not bound to accept the listed activ-
ities as dispositive. 65
The EEOC Guidelines do provide further clarification to those
individuals who claim to be limited in the major life activity of work-
ing.66 Specifically, the EEOC states that an individual must be "re-
stricted in the ability to perform either a class ofjobs or a broad range
of jobs" as compared with a person with similar training and abili-
ties.6 7 Thus, difficulty or inability in performing a single job does not
qualify someone as limited in the major life activity of working.6
c. Substantial Limitation
The EEOC Guidelines interpret "substantial limitation," a term
not clearly defined in the ADA's text itself, to mean either: (1)
"[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform," or (2) "[s] ignificantly restricted
as to the condition, manner or duration under which the individual
can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condi-
tion, manner or duration under which an average person in the gen-
eral population can perform that same major life activity. '69 The
Guidelines further state that in determining substantial limitation, the
following factors should be considered: "[t] he nature and severity of
the impairment," 70 "[t]he duration or expected duration of the im-
pairment, ' 71 and "[t]he permanent or long term impact, or the ex-
ciding that OCD is a disability under the ADA), with Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248,
1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (determining that OCD is not a disability under the ADA).
63 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A).
64 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2002).
65 See supra note 44.
66 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3).
67 Id. § 1630.2(j)(3) (i)
68 Id.
69 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii).
70 Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i).
71 Id. § 1630.2() (2) (ii).
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pected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment."
72
2. The Paths Indirectly Taken: "Regarded As" and "Record of"
Disability Prongs
In addition to a direct assertion of disability, an individual may
use an indirect route to achieve disability status by establishing that
she is regarded as, or has a record of, being disabled. 73 These prongs
of the disability definition recognize that disability may be a social
construction. 74 Thus, the statute also protects individuals who are dis-
advantaged because of their pasts or because of others' perception of
them.75 Both prongs refer to "such an impairment," thus ostensibly
incorporating the "substantial limitation" and "major life activities" re-
quirements from the first prong.76 The EEOC Guidelines explain that
an individual has a record of impairment if she "has a history of, or
has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities. ' 77 The EEOC
Guidelines also explain that an individual may be regarded as having a
disability in one of the following three ways: (1) having a physical or
mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activi-
ties but is regarded as such; (2) having a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits major life activities due only to others'
attitudes and perceptions toward the impairment; or (3) having no
72 Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii).
73 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (B), (C). Though these prongs are one step removed from the
question of whether the individual is actually mentally ill, in some ways, these prongs com-
port more with the ADA's stated purpose of preventing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities. SeeVande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995):
Many ... impairments are not in fact disabling but are believed to be so,
and the people having them may be denied employment or otherwise
shunned as a consequence. Such people, objectively capable of performing
as well as the unimpaired, are analogous to capable workers discriminated
against because of their skin color or some other vocationally irrelevant
characteristic.
74 Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of
the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405,
1432 (1999); see also Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. Rev. 1657, 1665
n.34 (1997). Higgins uses Nancy Hirschmann's definition of social construction:
[Social construction embodies] the idea that human beings and their world
are in no sense given or natural but the product of historical configurations
or relationships. The desires and preferences we have, our beliefs and val-
ues, our way of defining the world are all shaped by the particular constella-
tion of personal and institutional social relationships that constitute our
individual and collective histories.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting NancyJ. Hirschmann, Toward a Feminist Theory of Free-
dom, 24 POL. THEORY 46, 51 (1996)).
75 See Eichhorn, supra note 74, at 1432.
76 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C).
77 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).
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impairment at all (as defined by the Guidelines), but being treated by
her employer as if she did.78
B. Consequences of the Definition of Disability for the Mentally
Ill Plaintiff
The definition of disability, as it appears in the ADA, opens the
door to two possible, and potentially undesirable, consequences.
First, the definition is, on the whole, rather ambiguous, as the terms
used to define disability are strikingly broad and the statute does not
offer further clarification of these terms. This leaves room for varying
interpretations by the courts and has ultimately resulted in a rather
narrow interpretation of disability. 79 Further, the Act lumps both
mental and physical disability together under the same requirement
of impairment in the disability inquiry. Therefore, whatever interpre-
tive action a case takes with respect to physical illness will also have
binding force against mentally ill individuals, despite the fact that
what may be an appropriate determination in one context does not
necessarily translate to a desirable outcome in a drastically different
context.
80
Second, the definition of disability enables individuals who are
limited in areas of their lives that are completely unrelated to their
work performance to invoke protection under the law, and even to
elicit accommodations by the employer. However, the law neither
protects nor accommodates individuals who are suffering from dis-
crimination beyond the confines of the statute.8'
78 Id. §1630.2(l)(1)-(3).
79 In 2001, employers prevailed in over ninety-five percent of ADA employment cases
that reached the merits of claims by workers or job applicants. Smith, supra note 6, at 50;
see also Eichhorn, supra note 74, at 1434, 1444 -47 (examining cases in which illnesses such
as hemophilia, diabetes, and cancer did not satisfy the statutory definition of disability,
despite their severity and despite legislative history indicating that Congress had intended
for such serious diseases to be included within the realm of disability); Study Finds Employers
Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DIsABIL-
Iry L. REP. 403, 405 (examining final Title I case decisions and finding that the definition
of disability is "much more restrictive than those who drafted and supported the ADA had
thought it would be").
80 As an example, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478-80 (1999), the
Court examined the statute's legislative history to determine why the ADA drafters did not
intend to cover individuals with poor eyesight. However, the Court's holding that mitigat-
ing measures must be considered when determining whether an individual is disabled
means that individuals with serious impairments that are treated with medication may be
shut out of coverage under the ADA. Id. at 482.
81 See generally Friedland, supra note 56 (arguing that the ADA's failure to separate the
statute's two goals-preventing pure discrimination and providing affirmative accommoda-
tion-impedes the progress of individuals with disabilities and leads to inconsistent
results).
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II
THE SUPREME COURT'S BROAD STROKES: FLESHING OUT
(AND REINING IN) THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
Part I examined the text of the statute to discern what is required
in the ADA's disability inquiry. Examining the words of the statute
alone, however, is not sufficient to truly understand the plight of the
mentally ill plaintiff under the ADA's definition. It is important to
also consider the Supreme Court cases that have interpreted this defi-
nition. To date, the Supreme Court has not heard a case dealing with
a mentally disabled plaintiff attempting to gain protection under the
ADA in the employment context. The lower federal courts have ad-
dressed issues of mental illness under the ADA, and they have admit-
tedly struggled with how to treat such plaintiffs under the law. 82
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has dedicated a substantial amount
of time to clarifying the broad terms that define disability in many of
the ADA cases it has reviewed. Presumably, the Supreme Court Jus-
tices would use these same interpretations if and when they hear a
case concerning a mentally ill plaintiff. Although the Supreme
Court's past interpretation of disability has bolstered the understand-
ing of the term in the context of the statute, many of the lower court
cases have further narrowed the disability definition, thereby increas-
ing the possibility of excluding mental illness from coverage.
A. Bragdon v. Abbott: A Generous Interpretation of Disability
Status
One of the most important cases defining disability, Bragdon v.
Abbott,83 is also one of the most generous in considering what consti-
tutes a disability. In Bragdon, the Court found that an HIV-positive
individual, still asymptomatic, fell within the ADA's definition of a dis-
abled individual and therefore, passed the first hurdle to a successful
ADA claim.8 4 The Court held that HIV infection fell within the ADA's
82 See Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Proving the elements
of a mental disability will not be as easy or as clear cut as cases of physical disability. But,
though mental impairments create special problems under the ADA, Congress chose to
recognize these as disabilities under the Act."); Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook County, 117 F.3d
351, 351 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to per-
sons suffering from mental illness presents difficult issues . . . .") (citation omitted).
83 524 U.S. 624 (1998). Although this case does not concern the ADA in the employ-
ment context, the disability analysis is still important for our purposes because the Court
used the same disability definition. In Bragdon, respondent Abbott was refused in-office
dental treatment due to her asymptomatic HIV-positive status because the dentist had a
policy against filling cavities for HIV-positive patients outside of a hospital setting. Id. at
628-29. The respondent therefore sued under 42 U.S.C. § 12182, alleging discrimination
in a public accommodation. Id.
84 Id. at 641. The Court also addressed the "direct threat" provision of the ADA, 42
U.S.C. § 12182(b) (3), which indicates that an individual who creates a significant risk to
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definition of impairment,8 5 and further, that the respondent correctly
identified reproduction as a major life activity; the Court deemed re-
production "central to the life process itself."8' 6 The Court thus inter-
preted "major" to mean "significant,"87 as opposed to the dissent's
understanding of "major" to mean "greater in quantity, number, or
extent."'88 The Court further rejected the notion that a major life ac-
tivity must have a public, economic, or daily character.8 9
B. The Sutton Trilogy: Mitigating Measures
One year after Bragdon, the Supreme Court decided Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc.,90 Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,91 and Murphy v.
United Parcel Service, Inc.92 Taken together, these cases stand for the
proposition that, in considering whether a person is substantially lim-
the health or safety of others may be considered unqualified for purposes of the statute. Id.
at 648-50. Discussion of this provision, however, goes beyond the scope of this Note.
85 Id. at 632-33.
86 Id. at 638.
87 See id. ("[Tihe plain meaning of the word 'major' denotes comparative importance
.. ") (internal quotation marks omitted).
88 Id. at 659-60 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
89 Id. at 638. It is interesting to note that here, as in many other cases, there is no
requirement that the major life activity be tied in any way to the discrimination claim.
Because the purposes in the public services and accommodation realm differ from the
purposes in the employment context, this lack of a connection should not be troubling.
However, when considering disability in employment, the fact that the statute does not
further require a connection between the major life activity cited and the employee's work
performance often proves problematic, or even fatal, to individuals seeking the ADA's
protection.
90 527 U.S. 471 (1999). In Sutton, the petitioners were twin sisters who both had se-
vere myopia. Id. at 475. Uncorrected, each sister's vision was extremely poor, but with the
use of corrective measures, each sister had 20/20 vision or better. Id. United Airlines
denied both sisters the opportunity to interview for a commercial pilot position because
the sisters could not meet United's minimum uncorrected vision requirement. Id. at
475-76. Sutton is widely considered to be the leading case for the principle also set forth in
Albertson's and Murphy; in fact, the Court explicitly refers to Sutton in their analysis as sup-
port for the decisions in the other two cases. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555, 556 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
91 527 U.S. 555. In this case, petitioner fired respondent from his job as a truck driver
because he suffered from amblyopia, an uncorrectable visual condition which left him with
very poor vision in his left eye and in effect, monocular vision, and could not meet the
petitioner's corrected visual acuity standard. Id. at 558-60. Petitioner initially hired re-
spondent because the first doctor who examined him mistakenly certified that he met the
acuity standard. Id. at 559. After another doctor correctly determined that he did not
meet the standard, petitioner fired him and refused to rehire him even after he obtained a
waiver of the acuity standard. Id. at 559-60.
92 527 U.S. 516. The petitioner in Murphy was hired as a mechanic despite his high
blood pressure, a condition that should have caused him to fail the certification require-
ments of the Department of Transportation. Id. at 519. Petitioner took medication for his
high blood pressure, which allowed him to function normally in everyday activities, id. at
519-20, but he was fired when the certification error was discovered. Id. at 520.
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ited in a major life activity, the court must take mitigating measures
into account. 93
This assertion ran directly counter to the EEOC Interpretive
Guidelines, which, at the time, stated that "'[t]he determination of
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity
must be made on a case-by-case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures, such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."' 94
The Court found, despite the EEOC Guidelines, that in order to
achieve the ADA-mandated case-by-case inquiry, one must consider
the individual's situation as a whole, including the mitigating mea-
sures, lest the statute would treat all individuals with the same impair-
ment identically.95 Moreover, the Court declared that courts must
consider mitigating or corrective measures whether they are achieved
artificially or within the body's own corrective systems.96 Conse-
quently, an individual who uses mitigating devices to increase her
work productivity may find herself without the protection of the ADA.
C. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams: The
"Central to Daily Life" Inquiry
The facts in Toyota,97 the Court's most recent ADA decision, are
quite simple. Ella Williams worked on an engine fabrication assembly
line at an automobile manufacturing plant that required her to use
pneumatic tools.98 As a result of using these tools, she developed pain
in her wrists, arms, and hands, which a physician later diagnosed as
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendonitis. 99 Her physi-
cian permanently restricted her from performing various job-related
activities, including lifting more than twenty pounds, frequently lifting
objects up to ten pounds, performing repetitive motion with her wrists
or elbows, doing overhead work, or using vibrating or pneumatic
93 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-84 ("A 'disability' exists only where an impairment 'sub-
stantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substan-
tially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken .... [Ignoring an individual's actual
condition] is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the ADA."); Albertson's, 527 U.S. at
565-66 (stating that the ADA "concerns itself only with limitations that are in fact substan-
tial" and that "[m]itigating measures.., must be taken into account in judging whether an
individual has a disability"); Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521 (holding that consideration of mitigat-
ing measures is necessary to determine whether a limitation is in fact substantial).
94 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 (alteration in original) (citing EEOC Intepretative Guide-
lines, 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1998)).
95 Id. at 483.
96 Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66 ("We see no principled basis for distinguishing be-
tween measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures
undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems.")
97 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
98 Id. at 187.
99 Id.
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tools. 10 ° Williams' supervisor modified her duties for the next two
years10 1 and, subsequently, her employer, Toyota, placed her on a
team of Quality Control Inspection Operations. 10 2 At first, Toyota
only required Williams to perform certain tasks, but later, it required
all persons on the control inspection team to perform all tasks, includ-
ing a shell body audit. The shell body audit required Williams to hold
her hands and arms at about shoulder height for extended periods of
time, 10 3 causing her to suffer adverse medical consequences. 10 4 After
seeking the advice of a physician, who diagnosed her with further
health complications, Williams requested that she be allowed to per-
form only some of the control inspection team's tasks. 10 5 Shortly
thereafter, Toyota terminated Williams due to poor attendance. 10 6
Williams sued Toyota, claiming disability based on her carpal tun-
nel syndrome and related impairments, for failing to provide her with
a reasonable accommodation in accordance with the ADA. 10 7 Her dis-
ability claim was based on the grounds that her various physical im-
pairments substantially limited the major life activity of, among other
things, performing manual tasks. 108 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for Toyota after finding that Williams was not substan-
tially limited in any major life activity. 10 9 The Sixth Circuit reversed
the District Court's finding on the ground that Williams had shown
substantial limitation in the major life activity of manual tasks. 10 Con-
sequently, the Sixth Circuit granted partial summary judgment for
Williams on the issue of whether she was actually disabled for the pur-
poses of the ADA."' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the Sixth Circuit employed the proper standard in
determining disability status. 112
100 Id. at 187-88.
101 Id. at 188.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 189.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 190. Respondent and petitioner differed as to the exact course of events
following the medical diagnosis. Both parties agreed, however, that respondent requested
accommodation and was soon after terminated for poor attendance. Id. at 189-90.
107 Id. at 190.
108 Id. Respondent had also originally claimed substantial limitation in the major life
activities of lifting and working. See Respondent's Brief at 11-12 n.6, Toyota, 534 U.S. 184
(No. 00-1089). The Supreme Court, however, only considered respondent's claim with re-
gard to performing manual tasks. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 192.
109 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190-91.
110 Id. at 191-92; Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir.
2000), rev'd, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
III Williams, 224 F.3d at 843.
112 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 532 U.S. 970 (2001).
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In its analysis, the Court first looked to the language of the ADA
itself,' 1 3 as well as to the interpretive guidelines for both the Rehabili-
tative Act of 1973,114 which utilizes the same definition of disability,
and the EEOC Guidelines,1 5 for guidance in interpreting the ADA.1 16
The Court noted that although Congress intended the courts to con-
strue the terms of the statute in accordance with pre-existing regula-
tory interpretations, the EEOC Guidelines have questionable force in
interpreting the ADA. 117
The Court, however, used the interpretive guidelines merely as a
starting point from which to launch its own analysis of the definition
of disability.'18 The Court held that it is inadequate for a hopeful
plaintiff to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis in an at-
tempt to establish disability.' 19 Instead, a court must determine disa-
bility on an individual basis, especially when dealing with impairments
for which the symptoms vary from person to person. 120 The Court
explained that the drafters of the ADA designed the requirement of
substantial limitation of a major life activity to "preclude[ ] impair-
ments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of [ma-
jor life activities] from qualifying as disabilities."'12' Moreover, in
considering whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity, the Court reasoned that the "major life activity" must be one
that is of "central importance to daily life."1 2 2 Thus, the analysis in
ADA cases should not focus on the claimant's ability to perform the
tasks associated with the her particular job.123 Rather, courts must
make a broader, more searching investigation into how well the claim-
ant is able to perform a "variety of tasks" that are "central to most
people's daily lives."' 124
113 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(2), 12111(8), 12112(b) (5) (A) (2002).
114 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (B).
115 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)-(j) (2001).
116 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193-96 (2002).
117 Id. at 194. Ultimately, the Court did not rule on the force of the EEOC Guidelines
either way, as neither party had challenged them in this case. Id.
118 See id. at 196.
119 Id. at 198.
120 Id. The Court used carpal tunnel syndrome, claimed in this case as an impairment,
as an example illustrative of this point. Id. at 199.
121 Id. at 197.
122 Id.
123 See id. at 200-01.
124 Id. Thus, in Toyota, the Court declared that the Court of Appeals had improperly
focused their inquiry on respondent's performance of her job's specific tasks, while ignor-
ing the very evidence, such as respondent's ability to tend to personal hygiene and carry
out personal or household chores, that should have been determinative. See id. 201-02.
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D. Effect of Case Law on Mentally Ill Potential Plaintiffs
Although none of the above three cases involved mentally ill
plaintiffs, all have binding force on such individuals attempting to es-
tablish disability status. Further, from each, one can discern an im-
portant piece of information about mental illness under the ADA.
For example, the plaintiff in Bragdon, the most pro-plaintiff case
of the three, shares characteristics with mentally ill plaintiffs. As an
individual suffering from asymptomatic HIV, the plaintiff suffered
from a "hidden" disability, in that she had few, if any, obvious physical
manifestations of her illness. 125 This type of disability departs from
the "traditional" conception of disability that is generally marked by
an obvious physical limitation. 126 The fact that the Supreme Court
held asymptomatic HIV to constitute a disability is a promising notion
for individuals with mental disabilities.
The remaining cases, however, are significantly less generous,
and are generally regarded as pro-employer decisions. 127 Both cases
have outcomes that are understandable, even advisable, given the cir-
cumstances involved. Clearly, Congress did not intend for every indi-
vidual with correctable visual limitations or suffering from repetitive
stress injuries to find protection under the ADA; rather, the drafters
designed the statute to protect only those individuals who suffer from
significant physical or mental limitations. 128 When viewing the impact
of these holdings on disabled plaintiffs at large, however, one must
wonder whether these straightforward cases in context have created
undesirable precedential effect.
Sutton has obvious implications for disabled individuals, as miti-
gating measures would cover psychotropic medications. 129 This com-
plicates an already demanding set of requirements, and creates a
perverse set of incentives for mentally ill individuals who desire work-
place accommodation. The Sutton rule forces individuals with mental
illness to choose between two equally unattractive situations: 1) re-
maining in a less functional unmitigated state, but thereby potentially
having protection under the law, and 2) undergoing therapy, includ-
ing medication, which, if "too" effective, could potentially remove
them from the realm of disability and leave them unprotected at law,
though the discrimination they face may continue. Meanwhile, even
125 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 628 (1998).
126 SeeJean Campbell & Caroline L. Kaufmann, Equality and Difference in the ADA: Unin-
tended Consequences for Employment of People with Mental Health Disabilities, in MENTAL DISOR-
DER, supra note 6, at 221, 223 ("In the simplest view of disability, membership in the
community of 'the disabled' is both involuntary and obvious.").
127 See Smith, supra note 6, at 50-51 (stating that the recent Supreme Court decisions,
including Toyota, reinforce the "overwhelmingly pro-employer trend" in Title I ADA cases).
128 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999).
129 See id. at 488.
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if the individual can alleviate his condition with medication, the con-
dition still remains real and very present for the individual.
Finally, Toyota adds the requirement that the individual claiming
disability must be substantially limited in an activity that is "of central
importance to daily life."' 13 0 This clarification of the major life activity
requirement operates as a further narrowing of the class of individuals
who will be able to gain protection under the ADA. Further, the
Court's strict interpretation of substantial limitation in Toyota, requir-
ing a far-reaching and long-term impact, will also be limiting on indi-
viduals with mental illness, as such illnesses tend to ebb and flow as
opposed to being consistent in presence and severity.1 3 1 Mentally ill
individuals, by definition, are limited or affected cognitively in their
functioning in comparison with non-disabled individuals. 13 2 By re-
quiring that mentally ill individuals meet such a stringent test of prov-
ing pervasive limitation, rather than limitation that affects only work
performance and not other activities in daily life, the statute excludes
individuals who suffer from mild or moderate mental illness.
Meanwhile, in all likelihood, those individuals who can meet the
test for disability will not be able to meet the other requirement for
protection under the statute: ability to perform the essential functions
of the position, or qualified individual status. t 33 This ruling short-
changes both employer and employee, for the statute ignores individ-
uals with manageable mental illnesses and instead favors individuals
with profoundly debilitating mental limitations at the disability stage
of the inquiry. A more severely impaired individual, if she is able to
demonstrate that she qualifies under the statute, will require her em-
ployer to defend its business decisions at high cost if she resorts to
litigation. And in practice, these plaintiffs are the least likely to be
130 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
131 JOHN PARRY & F. PHILIPS GILLIAM, ABA COMM'N ON MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
LAW, HANDBOOK ON MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 12 (2002).
132 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(h)(2) (2000) (defining mental impairment as "any mental or
psychological disorder").
133 See JOHN W. PARRY, Am. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW,
MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr 29 (2d ed. 1997).
[N]ot being otherwise qualified is one of the most significant reasons why
persons with mental and physical disabilities fail to prevail in ADA employ-
ment-related actions. The dual requirements of having to demonstrate a
qualifying disability and being otherwise qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job arguably has become a catch-22 that makes it particu-
larly difficult for a person with a mental disability to prevail in court. In
order to overcome both of these hurdles, complainants have to demon-
strate simultaneously a substantial limitation in a major life function based
on their disability, while also demonstrating that any substantial limitation
they have does not make them unqualified to carry out essential job
functions.
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able to function sufficiently in the workplace, and thus are very un-
likely to obtain a favorable verdict.
III
A THRESHOLD DEVICE: PURPOSE OF THE DISABILITY
REQUIREMENT AND THE NATURE
OF MENTAL ILLNESS
After considering the full implication of the disability definition
as well as the relevant Supreme Court case law, which further explains
the disability standard, this Note now turns to the ways in which the
unique plight of the mentally ill plaintiff intersects with the demands
of the definition.
The statute requires an individual to meet a three-pronged in-
quiry to rise to the level of disability, because the drafters of the ADA
intended disability to be a threshold requirement. 3 4 The statute in-
tentionally excludes insignificant, trivial, or temporary illnesses or af-
flictions. 135 Thus, by requiring that an individual not only identify a
diagnosis or an ailment, but also an activity that is significantly af-
fected as a result, the statute sought to provide protection only to
those individuals who truly need such protection.1 36 In the instance
of a severely physically disabled individual who is nonetheless quite
capable of performing his job functions, the Act serves its intended
purpose of obligating the employer to make the accommodation that
will remove the proverbial stumbling block from the individual's
path. 137
The same kinds of statutory limitations should not be operative
with respect to mental illness, however, because mental illness varies
in significant degree from physical illness. First, mental illness is less
linear in progression than physical illness, in that mental illness tends
to be more erratic, less predictable, and more sudden.' 38 Many
mental illnesses tend to be episodic, following a kind of ebb and flow
134 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
135 See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196-97; Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,
565-66 (1999). See also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) ("Persons with minor, trivial im-
pairments, such as a simple infected finger are not impaired in a major life activity.").
136 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
137 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a).
138 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 322 (1993) (stating that mental illness is "sudden
and may not occur, or at least manifest itself, until adulthood" and that "diagnosis of
mental illness is difficult"); DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN ET AL., THE ADA AND PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS 7 (1993) ("Mental illnesses typically
are recurring, ongoing conditions that do not follow a regular pattern of development and
outcome.").
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one rarely sees in physical illness.139 Therefore, the factors that indi-
cate a serious or debilitating physical condition may be quite different
from those that are used to identify a serious mental condition. Addi-
tionally, in diagnosing mental illness, unlike in diagnosing a broken
leg or a virus-two potentially excludable impairments-a severity
and duration assessment has already been entered into the
calculus. 140 The DSM-IV relies on factors such as duration and sever-
ity in the initial diagnosis of the mental illness,141 whereas a physician
is able to diagnose a broken leg or influenza within days, or even
hours, of onset.
Mental illness differs from physical illness in at least two other
significant aspects. First, unlike physical illness, which is often fairly
apparent to others, mental illness tends to be hidden and is therefore
more difficult to diagnose. 142 The symptoms or results of a physical
disability tend to manifest themselves in obvious ways, whereas mental
disability is rarely as self-evident. 143 Particularly for an individual who
attempts to keep a mental disability private to avoid stigma or for
some other purpose, the lack of outward warning signs make the ill-
ness inherently more suspect, as many believe it could easily, and con-
veniently, be faked. 144 Additionally, even if the mental illness claim is
accepted as bona fide, mentally disabled individuals are much more
likely to be viewed as having control over the illness, or of suffering
from the illness as a result of a character flaw, rather than for a medi-
cally valid reason. 145 Society frequently assumes that a person with a
physically debilitating condition would prefer not to suffer from that
particular affliction, and that therefore, the condition is involuntary,
139 See Karin A. Guiduli, Comment, Challenges for the Mentally Ill: The "Threat to Safety"
Defense Standard and the Use of Psychotropic Medication Under Title I of the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act of 1990, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1149, 1179-80 (1996).
The episodic nature of mental illness is seen by some to be as much a part of the
debilitating nature of the illness as the symptoms themselves: "[A]n intermittent impair-
ment that is a characteristic manifestation of an admitted disability is, we believe, a part of
the underlying disability .... Often the disabling aspect of the disability is, precisely, an
intermittent manifestation of the disability, rather than the underlying impairment."
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995).
140 See DSM-V, supra note 59.
141 See id.
142 See Guiduli, supra note 139, at 1157 (1996) ("[U]nlike physical disability, which is
typically apparent, mental illness is a disease hidden in the mind.").
143 Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 126, at 224.
144 PARRY & GILLIAM, supra note 131, at 6 (" [T] here is a widespread belief that many
defendants/respondents are manufacturing mental impairments to benefit themselves
. .. ") (footnote omitted).
145 Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 126, at 223-24. An alternative theory, which is
more sympathetic to, and less suspicious of, mentally ill individuals, also calls into question
whether such illness truly exists. This theory rejects the concept of mental illness as a
social construct, invented by individuals with more power to oppress individuals with less
power. For a more complete discussion, see THOMAS S. SzASz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILL-
NESS (1974).
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and the individual, blameless.1 46 In contrast, individuals who suffer
from mental conditions are often perceived to be lazy, irrational, or
merely obstinate in their refusal to conquer the illness. 147
Second, the diagnosis and underlying understanding of mental
illness are significantly more complex than those of physical illness.
Physicians diagnose mental illness based upon the subjective symp-
toms that the individual experiences and relays to the health care pro-
vider' 48 Because a mentally ill individual's symptoms tend to be
much more severe than those of the rest of the population, 149 the
mental health care provider must engage in a very difficult, and often
contentious, line-drawing exercise to determine the point at which
the behaviors become abnormal. 150 This is true, in part, because the
medical community understands the "biology" of mental illness to a
much lesser degree than other kinds of illness, though physicians con-
tinue to make advancements in developing tools to better understand
the biological causes of mental illness. 51 Though mental illness may
be theoretically provable, it likely occurs as a result of some type of
brain malfunctioning, and therefore, because we lack the medical
technology to verify such malfunctioning during diagnosis, we must
often rely solely upon "symptomatology" without "proof' to back it.152
Further, the source of the illness may be difficult to ascertain, as most
mental illnesses are due to varied, and sometimes indirect, causes. 153
Therefore, understanding the reasons for mental illness, as well as
ways to diminish the individual's suffering through treatment, is both
146 See Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 126, at 223.
147 Id. at 223-24.
148 See Zylan, supra note 21, at 85 ("[T]he diagnosis of many disorders hinges on the
personal, subjective distress and experience of the patient.").
149 See id. ("The basic problem inherent in defining a mental disorder is that the pri-
mary criteria for determining whether a mental disorder exists requires a judgment about
the degree to which a behavior deviates from the norm.").
150 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) ("Psychiatry is not.., an exact science,
and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the
appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, [and] on cure and
treatment ....").
151 See PARRY & GILLIAM, supra note 131, at 39-40.
152 See JENNIFER HUGHES, AN OUTLINE OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY 15 (3d ed. 1991)
("Reaching a diagnosis in a psychiatric patient relies on accurate case history and mental
state examination. Laboratory investigations help in the minority of cases only."). How-
ever, some psychiatrists are able to confirm hypotheses regarding the biochemical origin of
a mental illness to some degree by observing a patient's reaction to medication. SeeJOHN
0. BEAHRS, LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHIATRY: THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINIY IN MENTAL HEALTH
21 (1986).
153 See HUGHES, supra note 152, at 3 ("For most psychiatric disorders ... the cause
appears to be 'multifactorial' or is unknown."); see also BEAHRS, supra note 152, at xix (list-
ing numerous potential causes for the onset of major depression).
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more individualized and more complex than understanding and treat-
ing the vast majority of physical illnesses.1 54
IV
BARRIERS TO SUCCESS FOR THE MENTALLY ILL
POTENTIAL PLAINTIFF
A. Jumping Hoops and Obstacle Courses: Actual Disability
The incompatibility of the disability definition with mental ill-
ness, explored above, has played out quite starkly in recent case law.
The two main shortcomings of the ADA's treatment of mental ill-
ness1 55 are borne out in the case law of the lower federal courts. By
and large, mentally ill individuals who attempt to gain protection
under the ADA are unsuccessful.1 56 On a conceptual level, it is diffi-
cult for individuals who are mentally ill and in the workforce to juggle
the dual requirements of disability and qualified individual status. An
individual who clearly suffers from a mental illness that has a detri-
mental effect on her work functioning may look to the statute for a
safe haven. What she finds instead are formalistic, rigid requirements,
which incur more qualifications and caveats with each Supreme Court
decision. What the ADA drafters intended to be an individualized,
case-by-case inquiry has turned into a series of obstacles and hoops, as
individuals attempt to translate the complexities of their experiences
into the "buzzwords" of the courts' opinions.157
1. Disabled but Still Qualified: The Inconsistent Pleading Problem
Part of the reason that the lower courts may have a hard time with
ADA cases involving mental illness is that the courts sense that the
claims are, in some way, disingenuous. They are, in part, correct, as
such individuals are trying desperately to achieve disability status by
identifying certain functions from an approved list that are severely
affected, while still maintaining that they are perfectly capable of per-
forming the job. As a result, the claims of substantial limitation of
major life activity may have nothing to do with the true impact of the
illness on the individual, or of the illness's impact on work function-
154 See HUGHES, supra note 152, at Part III (outlining the broad range of treatments for
mental disorders that a mental health specialist may use, either in isolation or in combina-
tion with other treatments, in treating her patients).
155 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
156 See Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental Disability
Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them, "31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 780 (1998) ("[I]n ...
every kind of psychiatric disability Title I ADA case, [the plaintiff] is losing.") (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
157 See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 1999) ("If there has
ever been a legal term of art, 'disabled' certainly qualifies.").
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ing.' 58 Consequently, the broad, complex issues a mentally ill individ-
ual faces are squeezed into a one-size-fits-all formula.
As an illustration, the Tenth Circuit was clearly uncomfortable
finding for an individual suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disor-
der (OCD) who claimed discrimination based on disability status, de-
spite the fact that his co-workers taunted him extensively for his
mental issues and his superiors disbelieved him when he tried to give
notice of his disability. 159 Instead of resting his claim upon the partic-
ulars of his experience and the resulting discrimination, the plaintiff,
in order to fit the form of an ADA claim, was forced to identify a
traditional major life activity that was substantially limited. 160 The
court ultimately was unconvinced that the plaintiff, a worker who was
"twice promoted on the basis of his performance," was substantially
limited in the major life activities of sleeping, walking, or interacting
with others. 161 The court held that the plaintiff did not meet the disa-
bility requirement, and consequently, he failed in his discrimination
claim.' 62 Though the plaintiff was clearly troubled, he attempted to
identify "safe" major life activities that courts have previously acknowl-
edged1 63 to fit his unique situation within the borders of the ADA. In
this case, the plaintiff failed, as the narrow list of "approved" catego-
ries did not allow him to get at the heart of his difficulty. 164
However, an individual who attempts to meander outside the ac-
cepted borders will not fare much better, as courts seem hesitant to
entertain alternate major life activities that are potentially more con-
cordant with the true experiences and challenges of mentally ill plain-
tiffs in the work setting. In the words of the Second Circuit with
respect to a mentally ill individual's attempt to adapt the "disability
equation" to a claim of substantial limitation in the major life activity
158 See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200-01 (2002) (holding
that the court of appeals erred because it incorrectly focused its inquiry on whether the
plaintiff was substantially limited in a major life activity by examining the major life activity
as it related to her job).
159 Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1250-52 (10th Cir. 2001). In this case, co-
workers in numerous departments taunted the plaintiff, calling him "Psycho Bob" among
other things, despite the fact that he switched to different departments in an attempt to
avoid such treatment. The plaintiff was ultimately terminated as the result of a workforce
reduction. Id. at 1252.
160 Id. at 1253.
161 Id. at 1250, 1253-55.
162 Id. at 1254-55.
163 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639-42 (1998) (reproduction); EEOC v.
United Parcel Servs., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 2002) (seeing); Webner v. Titan
Distribution, Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2001) (sitting, standing, lifting and reach-
ing); Williams v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., No. 00-3199, 2001 WL 617821 (10th Cir. June 5,
2001) (sleeping); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 307 (3d Cir. 1999) (think-
ing); Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 724-25 (7th Cir. 1995) (walking). See also supra text
accompanying note 64 (listing the major life activities set out in the EEOC Guidelines).
164 Steele, 241 F.3d at 1254-55.
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of "everyday mobility": "[The plaintiff] narrows the frame of reference
and hypothesizes a major life activity called 'everyday mobility,' which
he then defines (so far as he attempts to define it) largely by means of
examples that are coextensive with his symptoms."'165 Thus, despite
the fact that the plaintiff, who suffered from panic disorder and agora-
phobia, was significantly limited in day-to-day functioning, 166 the
court rejected his disability claim and afforded him no relief.16 7
Intuitively disbelieving the stylized claims, courts dispense of
them quickly, going for the most vulnerable element of the case, and
therefore, dismiss the claimants in the manner easiest to justify, given
the narrow formulation of disability. By and large, courts do not find
mentally ill individuals to be disabled, regardless of what substantial
limitation of a major life activity the individual claims, and regardless
of how severely limited the individual in fact may be. 168 For example,
the Seventh Circuit held that an individual suffering from severe de-
pression treated with Prozac and who had "consistently received good
performance evaluations," was not substantially limited in the major
life activity of working. 169 Despite the fact that the plaintiff stated that
he was "more irritable, less able to concentrate, and more prone to
fatigue than the average police officer," the court dispensed with his
claims, stating that his depression "[did] not appear to have impacted
his ability to perform the duties of a Chicago police officer.' 70
After the Sutton Court's mitigating measures ruling,' 7 ' even more
generous courts that might otherwise have more readily found disabil-
ity status will have to narrow their disability lens. For example, the
Third Circuit overturned a summary judgment against a bipolar plain-
tiff who had earned praises for her work performance prior to the
onset of her mental illness. 172 The circuit court, apparently more re-
165 Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs. Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 1998).
166 Id. at 148, 153. Due to his illness, the plaintiff was unable to take vacations or
perform routine errands such as visiting shopping malls, taking transportation that might
cross a bridge or tunnel or travel on high roads, staying at unfamiliar destinations over-
night, and traveling unaccompanied on trains. Id. at 153.
167 Id. at 152-53.
168 See, e.g., Ogborn v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 881, 305
F.3d 763, 767-68 (7th Cir. 2002); Cartwright v. Lockheed Martin Util. Servs., Inc., No. 00-
6671, 2002 'NL 1461753 (6th Cir. July 3, 2002); Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 241
(1st Cir. 2002); Palotai v. Univ. of Md. at Coll. Park, No. 00-1147, 2002 WL 1379969 (4th
Cir. June 27, 2002); Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., No. 99-1188, 2002 WL 500492 (4th Cir. Apr. 3,
2002); Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2002);
Steele, 241 F.3d at 1256; Evans v. Magna Group, No. 98-3125, 1999 WL 402401 (7th Cir.
June 11, 1999); Reeves, 140 F.3d at 154; Francis v. Chem. Banking Corp., 62 F. Supp. 2d
948, 962-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Sherman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 96 Civ. 9665, 1997 WL
452024, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1997).
169 Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2000).
170 Id. (emphasis added).
171 See discussion supra Part II.B.
172 Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 302 (3d Cir. 1999).
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ceptive to the plaintiff s claim of substantial limitation in the ability to
think than the district court had been-and presumably, than the vast
majority of federal courts would be-nonetheless noted that "the cen-
tral question [for the jury], in light of Sutton and Murphy, is whether
[the plaintiffs] continuing impairment remained a 'disability' under
the ADA by imposing substantial limitations even while treated."'173
Toyota, with its pervasive limitation requirement, 174 further narrowed
the disability requirement by throwing yet another qualification, and
blocking mechanism, at mentally ill plaintiffs.17 5
2. Pleading the Invisible: Proof Problems
A mentally ill individual who somehow successfully conceives of a
theory that will allow her to jump through both the disability as well as
the qualified individual hoops will have yet another, more practical,
hurdle: proving the illness's existence. Another reason why mental
illness is more problematic than physical illness under the ADA is that
mental illness lacks measurable or traceable criteria. 176 This is where
the Bragdon plaintiff-an individual suffering from asymptomatic
HIV-and the mentally ill plaintiff part ways. A simple blood test will
reveal the presence of asymptomatic HIV, whereas the only proof of
an individual's mental illness is her own subjective assessment of her
experiences. 177 Though mental illnesses are diagnosable, experts di-
agnose afflicted individuals largely on the basis of self-reporting, and
to a lesser extent, based upon observation of the patient. 178 Such a
symptomatological diagnosis, unsubstantiated by clinical evidence,
however, does not provide much proof with which to support a claim
in court. Furthermore, only the plaintiffs self-reported symptoms will
underlie the substantial limitation and major life activity claims. The
episodic, recurrent nature of mental illness thus makes substantial
limitation of major life activity more difficult to prove. A sudden
acute outburst of mental impairment may easily be dismissed as an
impairment of too short a duration to constitute a substantial limita-
tion, regardless of whether this assessment represents a correct char-
acterization of the illness.' 79
Such self-interest, without more, is a hard pill for the courts to
swallow, and furthermore, easy for them to dismiss. Courts are quick
to conclude that, for example, "[t] here is simply no way to determine
from [the plaintiffs] generalized allegations of sleep disturbance
173 Id. at 308, 311 (remanding the case to reconsider the plaintiffs disability status).
174 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
175 See discussion supra Part I.C.
176 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
177 See supra text accompanying note 148.
178 See supra notes 148, 152 and accompanying text.
179 Bell, supra note 35, at 207.
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whether she was significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration of her ability [to perform a major life activity] as compared
to the average person in the general population." 180 Findings that
confidently state that the plaintiff "failed to present any evidence" of
substantial limitation of a major life activity abound.181
Further, the individual's attempt to "burn the candle at both
ends" by simultaneously emphasizing the difficulties the mental illness
presents while downplaying the challenges so as to be fit for work lead
to an "I'm ok/I'm not ok" split in her litigation strategy. As was illus-
trated in Evans v. Magna Group, an individual who attempts to down-
play the impact of her illness, presumably in order to meet the
qualified individual status, will not be able to present sufficient evi-
dence to rise to the level of a disability under the statute. 182 The
Third Circuit recognized the irony involved when a plaintiff, in an
attempt to establish qualified individual status, effectively unseated
her substantial limitation of a major life activity claim, but it neverthe-
less unquestioningly accepted such irony in holding the individual to
be non-disabled. 183
Courts, often relying on therapists' notes which ordinarily span a
range of months or years and which reflect the normal variation in the
person's ability to cope with the illness and which reflect the often
oscillating nature of mental illness, judge the individual after the fact,
and discredit their claims of limitations. 84 In viewing these notes,
which also reflect the individual's improvements made in therapy and
which were not prepared to prove a legal theory, courts have either
rejected these illnesses as not rising to the level of disability, or found
180 Smoke v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-1370, 2000 WL 192806, *5 (10th Cir. Feb.
17, 2000) (finding that an individual suffering from depression failed to show substantial
limitation in a major life activity).
181 Evans v. Magna Group, No. 98-3125, 1999 WL 402401, *2 (7th Cir. June 11, 1999)
(emphasis added) (holding that an individual who suffered from OCD was not disabled
because she did not show that she was substantially limited in a major life activity). See also
Boyer v. KRS Computer & Bus. Sch., 171 F. Supp. 2d 950, 964 (D. Minn. 2001) (granting
summary judgment after finding that the plaintiff's claims that schizophrenia substantially
limited major life activities were "too vague and conclusory" to be successful); Olson v.
Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 966 F. Supp. 312, 314 (D.N.J. 1997) (noting the Third Circuit's
affirmation of its holding that the plaintiff, who suffered from multiple personality disor-
der and depression, was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because he had
"failed to demonstrate that his impairments substantially limited his major life activities").
182 Evans, 1999 WL 402401 at *2 (holding that because the plaintiff, who suffered from
OCD, stated in a deposition that OCD was a "fairly harmless disorder" that "did not in any
way prevent her from performing her job," she failed to establish impairment in any major
life activity).
183 Olson, 101 F.3d at 953 ("[T]he evidence that was apparently offered to demonstrate
Olson's fitness as an employee ironically establishes that he was not substantially limited in
a major life activity.").
184 See Smoke, 2000 WL 192806.
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that the illnesses' periods of severity did not coincide with the relevant
time period of an instant case. 18 5
By definition, many mentally ill individuals have an altered per-
ception of reality. 186 The courts, as a result, often read the attempt to
establish disability as merely an inability to cope with everyday stress or
an inability to work under a given supervisor, rather than as a true
limitation of a major life activity befitting of the disability inquiry.18 7
Courts are unwilling to recognize difficulties that arise from what they
perceive as "general stresses of the workplace"'188 or a "low threshold
of tolerance."18 9 Further, particularly where the individual has a solid
work history, the courts use that history to unseat claims of the individ-
ual's subjective experience, regardless of the fact that being able to
perform at some basic level, while still being severely limited in many
ways, is not an internally inconsistent state of being. 190
The only conceivable "hard evidence" that an individual might
supply as proof of true impairment and limitation is the administering
of medication to treat the alleged problems. However, after Sutton,
bringing medication into the court as "proof' of disability could just as
easily get the plaintiff escorted out of court as a corrected and non-
disabled individual. Oddly, often the only place a mentally ill plaintiff
can use medication as proof is in instances where the medication im-
poses physical side effects. The Ninth Circuit determined that a plain-
tiff suffering from anxiety, panic, and somatoform disorders had
raised a genuine issue of material fact about his ability to engage in
the major life activity of "sexual relations" due to his claimed impo-
tence caused by psychotropic medications.19' One has to wonder
whether Congress was attempting to protect individuals from psycho-
tropic side effects when it enacted this legislation, or if, in removing
185 Id.
186 See HUGHES, supra note 152, at 4 (defining mental illness as involving, among other
things, disorders in thought, perception, and cognition, and as sometimes including psy-
chosis, and symptoms outside normal experience, such as hallucinations or delusions).
187 See Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[The plain-
tiff] has not demonstrated that her depression substantially limits her ability to work or any
other major life activity. Instead, the record shows that [her] inability to work was due, not
to her depression, but to her inability to work under [her supervisor]."); Palmer v. Circuit
Court of Cook County, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[A] personality conflict with a
supervisor or coworker does not establish a disability within the meaning of the disability
law, even if it produces anxiety and depression, as such conflicts often do. Such a conflict
is not disabling; at most it requires the worker to get a new job.") (citation omitted).
188 Martin v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 95 C 2846, 1996 WL 648721, *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5,
1996).
189 Fenton v. Pritchard Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1437, 1446 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that
being easily angered is not a disability under the ADA).
190 See Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1250-52 (10th Cir. 2001) (involving a
plaintiff who, despite suffering from OCD, was able to perform his work duties effectively);
Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2000).
191 McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999).
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the disability inquiry so far from the initial problem, the ADA has
gone awry somewhere. This "proof problem," resulting from seem-
ingly contradictory evidence of ability to work and impairment of a
major life activity, provides courts with an easy way to dispose of
mental illness claims under the ADA without excluding mentally ill
plaintiffs outright.
B. Bleak Alternatives: Attempting To Remedy the Broken
Disability Definition with the "Record of" or "Regarded
As" Prongs
As a result of the exacting Toyota "central importance to daily
life" 192 interpretation of disability, many plaintiffs may justifiably look
to an alternative route to attain coverage under the ADA. On a theo-
retical level, it is troubling to think that individuals with mental illness
are so thoroughly shut out of achieving disability status by showing
that they have an actual disability that they are forced to attempt to
use the "back door" of the second and third prongs: having a record
of a disability or being regarded as disabled. 193 The inquiry in such a
claim would be one step removed from the disability itself, as the
plaintiff would have to convince the court that someone else thought
he was disabled, or that he used to be disabled, rather than conveying
the reasons why, in his own experience, he is actually limited. How-
ever, as a practical matter, such concerns would lessen if mentally ill
individuals were, in fact, successful using these alternative, albeit indi-
rect, routes. Unfortunately, mentally ill individuals who fail to estab-
lish actual disability are unlikely to find greater success through one of
the other two prongs.
First, as previously mentioned, these methods of establishing disa-
bility status are indirect; thus, the focus is not on whether the individ-
ual is actually currently disabled, but on whether there is a history or
perception of disability, regardless of whether the history or percep-
tions are erroneous.1 94 This method may be of limited use to individ-
uals with actual mental illness, given that mental illness is often
hidden and episodic, 195 and may also oddly exclude individuals who
are suffering from mental illness in favor of individuals who were pre-
viously mentally ill or who are mistakenly labeled mentally ill. Addi-
tionally, these two prongs present a more pragmatic problem.
Because both prongs include the language "such an impairment,"196
they ostensibly incorporate the substantial limitation of major life ac-
192 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
193 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (B), (C) (2000).
194 PARRY, supra note 133, at 9, 11-12.
195 See Bell, supra note 35, at 207.
196 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), (C).
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tivity requirements from the first prong, thereby importing all of the
problems of establishing actual disability. 197
A second practical problem arises with respect to the latter two
prongs of the disability inquiry. If the plaintiff is able to establish dis-
crimination on the basis of a past disability that is no longer substan-
tially limiting a major life activity, then it is unclear why her employer
would be required to make a reasonable accommodation. 198 Like-
wise, an individual who is only "regarded as" disabled due to a third
party's misperceptions rather than actually disabled would not seem
to be entitled to reasonable accommodation. 99 Rather, an individual
who experiences discrimination under the "regarded as" prong seems
to be in a situation analogous to that of individuals who experience
racial or gender discrimination. 20 0 Individuals who bring an ADA
claim under this prong are, after all, asserting not that they are actu-
ally substantially limited in a major life activity, but rather that the
employer wrongly judged them as substantially limited in a major life
activity. Therefore, like the gender or race discrimination victim, they
are entitled to be free from prejudice, but they are not entitled to
special accommodations. 20 1 Thus, such claims do not help an individ-
ual who is currently employed and wishes to receive assistance to im-
prove her performance at work.
1. Having a "Record of" a Disability
The ADA drafters designed the "record of' prong of disability to
protect individuals who have overcome their disability from an em-
ployer's residual hostility or stereotyping.20 2 This prong requires that
the employer know that the individual at one time suffered from a
mental illness.20 3
Unfortunately, the "record of' prong has not offered much pro-
tection to mentally ill plaintiffs. A survey of the federal case law under
the ADA shows that this prong is the least utilized of the three disabil-
ity prongs.20 4 Individuals likely shy away from it for many of the same
reasons this Note stated in the previous subpart.20 5 Under this prong,
a plaintiff must show that the past impairment, at one time, had sub-
stantially limited a major life activity.20 6 Given the difficulty present in
197 See Eichhorn, supra note 74, at 1432.
198 See Friedland, supra note 56, at 185-86.
199 See id. at 186.
200 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 962.
201 See id.
202 See S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 38-39 (1974), repinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389
(discussing the "record of' prong as embodied in the Rehabilitation Act).
203 PARRY & GILLIAM, supra note 131, at 64.
204 See Eichhorn, supra note 74, at 1461 n.363.
205 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1-2.
206 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2002).
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establishing discrimination based on current mental illness, even
where the individual is taunted about such illness, 20 7 as well as the
obvious practical reasons that an employee would desire to keep her
mental health history undisclosed, establishing that an employer dis-
criminated against an employee on the basis of a record of disability is
a very difficult additional hurdle for a potential plaintiff.
208
Because the "record of' prong is generally underused, there are
few cases involving this prong and a mentally ill plaintiff available for
examination. Those that do exist, however, do not present a brighter
picture than the cases decided under the first disability prong. Sev-
eral district courts have read the "record of' prong narrowly, holding
that the record of a psychiatric hospital stay due to a mental illness is
insufficient to establish a "record of' a disability.20 9 Although the
plaintiffs established that they had been hospitalized due to the sever-
ity of their mental illness, the courts rejected their claims of disability,
by declaring that the hospital records were insufficient to establish
that the individuals had a record of being substantially limited in a
major life activity. 210 Likewise, an individual who had taken two leaves
of absence, during which a physician certified that she was unable to
work, failed in her attempt to establish that she had a record of disa-
bility, because she did not show that she was substantially limited in
any major life activity. 211
2. Being "Regarded As" Disabled
The ADA drafters designed the "regarded as" prong to protect
individuals from being disadvantaged purely as a result of stereotyping
and misperceptions. 21 2 As mentioned above,2 13 the EEOC Guidelines
list three scenarios in which an individual would qualify as disabled
under this third prong: 1) having a physical or mental impairment
that does not substantially limit major life activities but is regarded as
such; 2) having a physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-
its major life activities due only to others' attitudes toward the impair-
207 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 953 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
that an individual did not establish the elements of actual disability and, therefore, likewise
failed on his claim of having a record of a disability).
209 See Heisler v. Metro. Council, No. 00-2749, 2001 WL 1690052 (D. Minn. Dec. 14,
2001) (hospitalized for major depressive disorder), rev'd in part on other grounds, 339 F.3d
622 (8th Cir. 2003); Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 356-58
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (hospitalized for bipolar disorder).
210 Heisler, 2001 IA 1690052; Horwitz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 356-58.
211 Doebelev. Sprint Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1212 (D. Kan. 2001), rev'd in part on
other grounds by Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003).
212 See S. REP. No. 101-16, at 23 (1989) (stating that "[the] third prong includes an
individual who has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major
life activities, but that is treated by [an employer] as constituting such a limitation").
213 See supra text accompanying note 78.
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ment; or 3) having no impairment at all, but being treated by her
employer as disabled. 214 The second of these scenarios allows for the
possibility of an individual achieving disability status, even if he is not
perceived as being substantially limited in a major life activity, if the
discrimination itself, or perception thereof, causes substantial limita-
tion of a major life activity.215 However, the Sutton Court oddly only
recognized the first and third scenarios to achieving disability status
through the "regarded as" disabled prong, essentially requiring the
employer to believe that the individual is substantially limited in a ma-
jor life activity due to a real or perceived impairment.216
The legislative history indicates that the drafters of the ADA had
intended the third disability prong to be read fairly expansively.2 17
Further, one could argue that the ADA should cover discrimination
based on any kind of impairment.218 After all, if we believe that dis-
crimination on the basis of any kind of impairment should not be
tolerated in our society, why should protection under the ADA de-
pend on whether an employer behaves in a discriminatory fashion to-
wards a severely impaired or a more moderately impaired
individual?219 Nevertheless, despite existing alternatives, the lower
214 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1)-(3) (2002).
215 See Feldblum, supra note 56, at 130; Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the
"Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. Rv. 587, 597-98 (1997).
Mayerson argues that the "regarded as" definition of impairment is superfluous, because
once an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity, even if it is only due to the
attitudes of other people, the individual would qualify under the first prong of the disabil-
ity definition and therefore, would not need to resort to the third prong. See id. at 597.
216 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). The Court declared:
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within [the] stat-
utory definition [of regarded as having a disability]: (1) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that a person has [an] impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly
believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or
more major life activities. In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity
entertain misperceptions about the individual-it must believe either that
one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that
one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is
not so limiting.
Id.
217 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23-24 (1989). See also Eichhorn, supra note 74, at
1465-67 (arguing that legislative history reveals a broader intended reading of the "re-
garded as" prong).
218 Feldblum, supra note 56, at 101-02.
219 Id. Feldblum likens the situation to race, gender, and sexuality discrimination,
pointing out:
[M]ost white people, or most men, or most heterosexuals [do not] experi-
ence discrimination on the basis of their race, gender, or sexual orienta-
tion. Nevertheless, as a society, we have not passed laws that prohibit
discrimination solely against those individuals whose race, or gender, or sex-
ual orientation have historically been the object of stigma and discrimina-
tion. Rather, our civil rights laws prohibit the use of a characteristic that the
legislature has decided should ordinarily be irrelevant in decision-making.
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courts have effectuated a much narrower reading of this prong, so as
to defeat its true purpose. In fact, one commentator has said that the
courts' current approach has "effectively shut out this avenue of
relief."220
The main source of the problem is that lower courts tend to re-
quire that the individual show not only that her employer behaved in
a discriminatory fashion based on stereotypes or misconceptions
about the individual's perceived mental illness, but also that the em-
ployer believed that the illness substantially limited a major life activ-
ity.22 1 This requirement is stringent; a plaintiff must prove with
particularity that an employer perceived her as substantially limited.
Consequently, courts have dismissed many plaintiffs' claims that they
were "regarded as" disabled due to mental illness for failure to meet
this standard.222
For example, the Tenth Circuit held that a plaintiff did not suffi-
ciently establish that her employer perceived her as substantially lim-
ited, despite the fact that she established that her employer referred
to her as "incapacitated" and that her work problems were "not [ ]
fixable" as a result of her major depression and anxiety attacks. The
court held that these statements alone were too generalized to satisfy
the disability requirement.223
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit rejected a plaintiffs claim that he
was "regarded as" disabled by his employer, where the employer knew
that the plaintiff suffered from major depression and required that
the plaintiff participate in the a "Personnel Concerns Program" where
he was more closely monitored than his peers, because the employer
allowed him to keep his job as a police officer and to continue to carry
a gun.2 2 4 Apparently because the employer allowed the plaintiff to
Once that characteristic has been identified, no decision may be made on
that basis (unless otherwise justified by the law) regardless of who possesses
that characteristic.
Id. at 101.
220 Locke, supra note 8, at 141.
221 See PARRY & GILa MA, supra note 131, at 64-65.
222 See, e.g., Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 153-54 (2d
Cir. 1998); Huizenga v. Elkay Mfg., 2001 WL 640973 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2001); Doebele v.
Sprint Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1212-14 (D. Kan. 2001), rev'd inpart on other grounds by
Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003); Law v. Garden State
Tanning, 159 F. Supp. 2d 787, 791-92 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Robb v. Horizon Credit Union, 66
F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (C.D. Ill. 1999); Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1124-25 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
223 Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 499 (10th Cir. 2000). See also Steele v.
Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that although the employer
knew of the plaintiff's disability and of the medication he was taking, and had expressed
concern over the plaintiff's mood swings, thinking that such mood swings were the result
of plaintiff's medication, this knowledge was still insufficient to create a triable issue of fact
as to whether the plaintiff was "regarded as" disabled).
224 Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 513-14 (7th Cir. 2000).
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retain his position at the police department, the court concluded that
the employer did not believe that the plaintiff was restricted in his
ability to do his job, and thus his claim of being regarded as disabled
necessarily failed.22 5
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit found that an individual was not re-
garded as disabled because the employer did not believe she was sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity, despite the fact that the
employer offered her paid medical leave and required that she see a
psychologist before returning to work.226 The court reasoned that
"[e] mployers need to be able to use reasonable means to ascertain the
cause of troubling behavior without exposing themselves to ADA
claims ... *"227 As these cases illustrate, the plaintiff's mere showing
of substantial limitation of a major life activity is difficult, but the addi-
tional requirement of showing that his employer believed he was sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity-as the "regarded as" disability
prong requires-makes the task nearly impossible.
Further, as a result of the lower court's reading of the third
prong, most individuals identify "working" as the major life activity
that the employer believed was substantially limited.228 Such a tactic is
unsurprising, as working is the most plausible major life activity the
plaintiff can readily use to demonstrate that the employer perceived
the employee to be limited at the time of the adverse employment
action. However, the EEOC Guidelines have interpreted substantial
limitation in working to mean limitation in a "broad class of jobs,"229
an interpretation that most of the courts have wholeheartedly en-
dorsed.2 30 By and large, with such a standard, plaintiffs fail. 231 In fact,
in Sutton, the petitioners' attorneys accepted that they had to show
substantial limitation in a broad class ofjobs, rather than arguing for a
less stringent standard. 232 Predictably, individuals have experienced
225 See id. at 514.
226 Cody v. CIGNA Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 598-99 (8th Cir. 1998).
227 Id. at 599.
228 See Mayerson, supra note 215, at 598.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
230 Id.; Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002) (quoting
Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)), and finding that the EEOC's definition of substantial
limitation applies to either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes);
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 517 (1999) (citing the EEOC's defini-
tion of substantial limitation as applying to "either a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs
in various classes" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92 (same).
231 See, e.g., Shiplett v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 182 F.3d 918 (Table) (6th Cir.
1999); Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 1998);
Whalley v. Reliance Group Holdings, Inc., 2001 WL 55726 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2001). See also
Locke, supra note 8, at 122-23 (noting that courts generally require plaintiffs to show that
they are unable to do practically all otherjobs except the one that they were actually doing
under the current standard).
232 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490.
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tremendous difficulty establishing that an employer believed them to
be incapable of working at any of a broad class of jobs at the time of
the adverse employment action. Most employers reasonably only
think about their own needs, as opposed to the larger employment
implications for the employee, when they make business decisions. 233
Further, it is not a heavy burden for the employer to establish that
there is some existing set of jobs that she believed the plaintiff would
have been qualified to do. 234 Finally, the dilemma of "burning the
candle at both ends" is overtly present here: if an employer truly be-
lieved that the plaintiff was unqualified to perform a broad class of
jobs, then she would generally be able to defend her employment de-
cision by showing also that the plaintiff was not qualified for the essen-
tial functions of the position in question. Because there is a slim
likelihood that an individual would be unqualified for most jobs, but
qualified for the one the plaintiff formerly held, the courts would
likely find such an assertion to be untenable. 23 5
Thus, the "record of' and "regarded as" prongs of the statute do
not present much respite from the difficulties that plague the first
prong of the statute. Regardless of which prong a mentally ill plaintiff
chooses to sue under, the bottom line is that the claim is exceedingly
likely to be unsuccessful.
V
RESOLUTION
This Note has explored the intricacies of the disability definition,
and has attempted to make tangible the various ways this definition
has failed to protect mentally ill plaintiffs. This Part aims to offer
deeper insight into the reasons for the ADA's failures, as well as pre-
sent the choices that we, as a society, face.
First and foremost, the drafters created the ADA with the specific
purpose of "bring[ing] persons with disabilities into the economic
and social mainstream of American life." 236 Reality tells a different
story. More than one in five Americans has a diagnosable mental ill-
ness in a given year. 237 These individuals are the second largest group
of individuals with disabilities that file charges with the EEOC. 238
233 See Locke, supra note 8, at 143.
234 See id. at 124-25. See also Feldblum, supra note 56, at 157 ("Thus, if a defendant
employer refuses to hire an individual because of an impairment, but concomittantly [sic]
believes the individual's impairment will not preclude her from working elsewhere, the
defendant will not have regarded the individual as being substantially limited in the life
activity of working.").
235 See Locke, supra note 8, at 127.
236 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989).
237 Hall, supra note 6, at 248 (providing data from 1993).
238 Id. at 247 (citing U.S. EEOC data from 1993).
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Mental disorders in the workplace that are not treated properly give
rise to many and varied problems, including stigmatization by other
employees, work impairment for the mentally ill individuals, and the
increased societal cost of decreased productivity and lost work days.239
Despite the congressional intent to aid individuals with mental disabil-
ities in the workplace, the employment rate for these individuals has
remained the same as it was in a pre-ADA world. 240 When reviewing
the ADA's effectiveness for people with mental disabilities in light of
Congress's stated purpose of a national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals, it is painfully clear that the ADA
has been woefully inadequate at attaining those goals. 241 Conse-
quently, change is imperative.
First, employers must be more flexible in their conception of ac-
commodation. Although a request for accommodation may be unu-
sual, the employer should try to effectuate the request if it is feasible
and not unduly costly. Additionally, at the litigation stage, courts
should interpret the disability requirements more flexibly, so that in-
stead of forcing plaintiffs to fit their experience into the ADA
"formula," the courts engage in a truly individualized inquiry, with a
fundamental focus on the fairness of the employer's actions. The
ADA disability inquiry must be freed from its "term of art" status.
Nevertheless, working within the confines of the statute is not
enough. The structure and ideology of the ADA excludes most men-
tally ill individuals, and under the current text of the ADA alone, even
with a more flexible interpretation, the statute will continue to ex-
clude most mentally ill individuals from protection in the work-
place.242 The drafters designed the employment components of the
ADA to enable individuals to compete in the job market. For that
purpose, it may indeed have been effective. After all, many of the
people claiming mental disability for whom the ADA has denied cov-
erage were likely unable to perform as well as individuals who do not
suffer from mental limitations. However, this leveling approach has
proven itself to be laden with problems for the mentally ill.
An amendment or addition to the text of the ADA is one possible
solution to this problem. Many commentators and supporters of the
mentally ill have proposed such a remedy. 243 However, this Note does
not, likewise, advocate revision of the statute, because such a revision
239 Id. at 246-248.
240 MENTAL DISORDER, supra note 6, at 199-200 (citing data from 1994).
241 See generally Stefan, supra note 11 (arguing that the ADA's inclusion of mental disa-
bilities as protected from discrimination and subsequent treatment of mentally ill plaintiffs
in the courts amounts to a delusion of rights).
242 See supra Part V.A-B.
243 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 10, at 972-73 (proposing an amendment to the "re-
garded as" prong of the ADA in order to better accommodate mentally ill plaintiffs).
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would likely be ineffective in ameliorating the harm mentally ill plain-
tiffs face. At this moment in history, our judicial system is reluctant to
allow mentally ill plaintiffs to prevail on their disability discrimination
claims. Courts show a great discomfort in dealing with these cases,
and apparently intuit that mentally ill individuals should not recover
for employment discrimination. Even though it so happens that the
ADA is an extraordinarily broad and ambiguous statute under which
to justify such a result, it is likely that mentally ill plaintiffs would fail
even if the statute's language were changed. This phenomenon is
part of a larger societal lack of resolve regarding mentally ill individu-
als in America.
We, as a society, have reached a crossroads in our treatment of
the mentally ill population. We exhibit a profound ambivalence re-
garding what we believe constitutes mental illness, whether mental ill-
ness constitutes disability, and how afflicted individuals should be
treated. 244 Part of the problem is that "disability," unlike race and
gender, is a relative term, as it is defined in terms of how much a
person's mental functioning "deviates" from the norm. 24 5 The man-
ner in which our society treats the mentally ill indicates that we are
undecided whether we believe, as we do with reference to race and
gender, that mentally ill individuals should be integrated into our
society.
2 4 6
Mentally ill individuals, and the health care practitioners who
treat them, continue to experience pervasive stigmatization at the
hands of the "normal" public at large. 247 Society often treats mentally
244 See 135 CONG. REc. S10,753 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
What concerns me is the thought that this disability might include some
things which by any ordinary definition we would not expect to be included
.... Mental disorders, such as alcohol withdrawal, delirium, hallucinosis,
dementia with alcoholism, marijuana, delusional disorder .... I could not
imagine the sponsors would want to provide a protected legal status to
somebody who has such disorders ....
Id.
245 See generally PAULA J. CAPLAN, THEY SAY YOU'RE CRAzY. How THE WORLD'S MOST
POWERFUL PSYCHIATRISTS DECIDE WHO'S NORMAL (1995) (exploring the often arbitrary and
unclear definition of abnormality as opposed to normalcy).
246 See SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 8-9 (2001) (citing a recent Harris
poll in which fifty-nine percent of respondents stated they would be very comfortable meet-
ing someone wheelchair bound and forty-seven percent stated they would be comfortable
meeting someone blind, but only nineteen percent stated that they would be comfortable
meeting someone who had a mental illness).
247 Id. at 4-5 ("Discrimination pervades the lives of people with psychiatric diagnoses
.... Social science research confirms that mental illness is one of the most-if not the
most-stigmatized of social conditions."); see generally STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS (Paul Jay
Fink & Allan Tasman eds., 1992) (exploring the way that mentally ill individuals, their
families, and their health care providers are stigmatized, both historically and in present
times).
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ill individuals with suspicion, contempt, and fear.248 Even after the
adoption of the ADA, very little has changed: mentally ill individuals
tend to be substantially more disadvantaged in the workplace as com-
pared with the rest of the population. 249
Both the development of the ADA and subsequent lawyering
under it have been plagued by ambivalence and discrimination. 250 Al-
though the statute's drafters intentionally included individuals with
mental illness within the pool of individuals the Act was designed to
assist,2 51 from the outset, the needs and unique nature of mental ill-
ness have continually been ignored. The ADA, while purporting to
create equality for the mentally ill, has never fully committed to eradi-
cating discrimination against these individuals. 252 Society has not yet
assumed the responsibility of doing so. As long as the ADA pays only
lip service to discrimination against the mentally ill, without leading to
relief for the mentally ill individuals who genuinely try to rid their
lives of such discrimination, anti-discrimination disability law will re-
main of limited value to individuals with mental illness.
Consequently, society, as well as the law, faces a choice. If we
continue to straddle the proverbial fence about whether to integrate
mentally ill individuals into the workforce, or if we are unwilling to
assume responsibility for managing the unique position of individuals
with mental illness in the realm of employment, then perhaps the
range of these individuals that are covered under the ADA should be
narrowed to include only those illnesses that are deemed worthy of
protection. 253 Although such action would be drastic, and would un-
fairly leave some individuals without recourse for the discrimination
they experience, it seems equally unfair to permit mentally ill individ-
uals to dedicate time, energy, and money to litigating claims that are
rarely, if ever, granted relief. The growing din of dissatisfaction from
248 STEFAN, supra note 246, at 10-11.
249 See Edward H. Yelin & Miriam G. Cisternas, Employment Patterns Among Persons with
and Without Mental Conditions, in MENTAL DISORDER, supra note 6, at 25, 36-37 (finding that
for the period from 1987 to 1991, persons with mental illness had much lower employment
rates than those without mental conditions).
250 Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth ": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why
and How Mental Disability Law Developed as it Did, 10J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 4 (1999)
(arguing that mental health law is plagued by "sanism," an "irrational prejudice" that "is
based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization," which
"infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices").
251 Mental illness was not included without a fight, however. See STEFAN, supra note
246, at 6 ("Mental illness was the only disability that was subject to attack on the floor of
Congress during the debate over the ADA.") (footnotes omitted).
252 See id. at xiii.
253 For example, the ADA could acknowledge certain illnesses listed in the DSM-IV to
the exclusion of others. See DSM-IV, supra note 59. Alternatively, the Act could identify
more specific criteria in defining disability with respect to mentally ill individuals, to create
a narrower class of individuals who would be afforded protection under the law.
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dissonant voices that advocate for change in how we treat mental ill-
ness, however, indicate that this is not the proper solution.
If we are, within the realm of the law as well as within the larger
context of society, truly committed to the stated purposes of the ADA
and thus, desirous of integrating individuals with mental disabilities
into the workforce, change is necessary. Mentally ill plaintiffs must
begin to look outside the confines of the ADA to find respite from
discrimination. One example of an alternative can be found in the
recent Seventh Circuit case of Byrne v. Avon Products, Inc.2 54 In this
case, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs severe depression
prevented him from meeting the statutory definition of a qualified
individual with a disability, and therefore, found him unable to assert
a valid discrimination claim under the ADA. 255 In doing so, the court
noted the fact that the ADA only applies to individuals who can "do
the job," thereby taking individuals who need long periods of time off
out of the range of individuals protected under the ADA. 256 However,
the court did not leave the individual without any protection. Instead,
it reversed the grant of summary judgment with respect to the claim
asserted under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) .257 The
FMLA was designed to provide greater flexibility to working individu-
als with children and to foster "stability and economic security of fami-
lies,"258 not to remedy discrimination against individuals with mental
disabilities. Despite this fact, the Seventh Circuit found that an indi-
vidual in need of leave due to a "serious health condition," such as
mental illness, might be able to recover under the FMLA. 259 Thus, as
an interim measure, plaintiffs should examine alternative sources
such as the FMLA under which to state a cause of action. If the ADA
will not suffice, perhaps other courts will follow the Seventh Circuit in
affording mentally ill plaintiffs relief through claims outside the
ADA.
2 6 0
However, looking to alternate grounds for one's discrimination
claim at the litigation stage alone is not the solution. Much of the
answer must lie outside the courtroom. The key to truly integrating
the mentally ill will likely require creating incentives and training for
mentally ill individuals to make such individuals competitive in the job
254 328 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2003).
255 See id. at 380-81.
256 Id. at 381.
257 Id. at 382; see 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
258 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (b)(1).
259 See Byrne, 328 F.3d at 382.
260 Of course, the fact that mentally ill plaintiffs must resort to a statute that Congress
designed for a wholly different purpose because the ADA offers such little chance for suc-
cess further illustrates the ADA's inadequacy. Therefore, this Note suggests resort to alter-
native statutes such as the FMLA only as an interim measure to increase plaintiffs' chances
at the litigation stage, rather than as a permanent, or ideal, solution.
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market, and thus less likely to resort to litigation. The legislature must
act to achieve true integration for the mentally ill; courts are neither
best equipped, nor evidently inclined, to address this pervasive social
issue through litigation.
As a start, Congress could create a national training program to
work with individuals who suffer from more pervasive mental illnesses.
Such a program would enable the participants to manage their ill-
nesses in order to meet the expectations that would be placed upon
them in competitive employment. The program would be rehabilita-
tive in purpose: mentally ill individuals could develop coping mecha-
nisms necessary to handle their illness in the employment context,
and do so in a more supportive atmosphere. Further, Congress could
create mandatory educational programs to destigmatize mental illness
in the workplace. Employers would communicate to employees that
discrimination and stigmatization against individuals with mental ill-
ness was unacceptable, thereby eliminating a significant additional
hurdle to the mentally ill. Finally, Congress could create a tax incen-
tive structure to encourage employers to "take a chance" on mentally
ill employees after such individuals had completed the training pro-
gram. Such an "affirmative action" based approach may suit mentally
ill individuals better than the current bare-bones equal opportunity
structure.
CONCLUSION
The specific strategies presented above are, of course, merely
ideas; they are not the only, or even necessarily the most effective,
possibilities. What is crucial, however, is the underlying shift in think-
ing about how to approach mental illness in the workplace. The sug-
gestions seek to encourage greater societal responsibility for training
and employing mentally ill individuals, as well as more pro-active, pre-
ventative, and supportive tactics aimed at integrating individuals with
mental illness into the workforce. The effectuation of such a shift in
thinking would hopefully greatly decrease the amount of ADA dis-
crimination claims brought by mentally ill plaintiffs, as it would ad-
dress the problem of integrating the mentally ill population at a much
earlier stage. Ideally, individuals with mental illness in the workplace
would face less discrimination, and therefore, have less of a need to
resort to the courts. Ultimately, such an approach just might be the
initial step to achieving the laudable goals of the ADA.
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